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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices have access to personal, potentially sensi-
tive data, and there is a growing number of applications that
transmit this personally identifiable information (PII) over
the network. In this paper, we present the AntShield sys-
tem that performs on-device packet-level monitoring and de-
tects the transmission of such sensitive information accu-
rately and in real-time. A key insight is to distinguish PII
that is predefined and is easily available on the device from
PII that is unknown a priori but can be automatically detected
by classifiers. Our system not only combines, for the first
time, the advantages of on-device monitoring with the power
of learning unknown PII, but also outperforms either of the
two approaches alone. We demonstrate the real-time per-
formance of our prototype as well as the classification per-
formance using a dataset that we collect and analyze from
scratch (including new findings in terms of leaks and pat-
terns). AntShield is a first step towards enabling distributed
learning of private information exposure.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have access to a wealth of personal, po-
tentially sensitive information and there is a growing num-
ber of applications that access, process and transmit some of
this information over the network. Sometimes this is justi-
fied (required for the intended operation of the applications,
e.g. location is needed by GoogleMaps) and controllable
(e.g. by the user through permissions), but for the most part,
users are not in control of their data today. Applications and
third party libraries routinely transmit user data to remote
servers, including adservers and trackers, and users are typ-
ically unaware of how their personal data is shared and for
what purpose.
Prior work on improving data transparency and identify-
ing potential privacy leaks includes static and dynamic anal-
ysis and network-centric approaches. In this paper, we take
the latter approach: personal information leaks happen, by
definition, over network traffic, therefore a natural and com-
prehensive vantage point to identify and control leaks is at
the network layer. Traffic can be monitored in the middle of
the network (as in Meddle [1] and Recon [2]) and/or on the
device itself (as in AntMonitor [3][4] and Lumen (a.k.a.
Haystack) [5]). A key challenge for network-based moni-
toring is how to analyze traffic both efficiently and securely.
The current state-of-the-art consists of the following com-
plementary approaches. On one hand, AntMonitor [3] and
Lumen [5] detect leaks on the device, but require a black-
list of strings (potential PII leaks) known a priori to search
for. Therefore, they are unable to detect leakage of informa-
tion that changes dynamically or is not part of the list. On
the other hand, Recon [2] recently addressed this limitation,
by training classifiers in a fully centralized way. However,
the implementation relied on a trusted, remote proxy to route
and analyze traffic, which potentially impacts scalability and
security.
We adopt the on-device network monitoring paradigm,
which presents both opportunities and challenges. On the
upside, it obviates the need for a trusted infrastructure and
gives full control to the user, which we believe is the right
approach in privacy. Devices also have access to important
contextual information, such as certain personal information
available on the phone, and which apps are responsible for
transmitting packets. On the downside, mobile devices have
limited resources to conduct traffic analysis, including deep
packet inspection (DPI), and training and applying machine
learning classifiers for inferring leaks of PII. It is currently
an open question as to how to train machine learning classi-
fiers to retain high accuracy in a truly distributed manner.
In this paper, we take the first step towards enabling dis-
tributed learning of personal information leaks from network
traffic. We present AntShield - a system that performs effi-
cient on-device analysis, provides accurate and comprehen-
sive data privacy protection, and gives users transparency
and control over their personal information in real-time. A
key insight is the distinction between PII that is predefined
by the user or is readily available on the device, from PII that
is a priori unknown and should be inferred by classifiers. We
propose a hybrid String Matching-classification approach:
(i) we build on the AntMonitor Library [3] for intercept-
ing packets on the device and looking for predefined strings
in real-time and (ii) we build classifiers for the remaining
unknown PII.
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The contributions of this paper are the following:
• the AntShield System. We present the first system to
detect PII exposure (using a hybrid DPI and classifica-
tion approach), 100% on the device (from user space
and without routing traffic through a remote VPN server),
and in real-time (in ~1 ms). This is enabled by our sys-
tem design and multiple optimizations.
• Classification Methodology. Our multi-label classifi-
cation methodology (Binary Relevance with Decision
Trees) achieves significantly higher accuracy (8-25%
improvement) and lower variance (a factor of 2-5) com-
pared to state-of-the-art. We also design and advocate
for per-app, instead of per-domain, classifiers: they
achieve similar classification accuracy, but allow faster
and more scalable operation while covering more traf-
fic.
• Dataset and Analysis. In order to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of our approach, we collect a new (larger
and richer than previously available) dataset of privacy
leaks on mobile devices, which we will make avail-
able to the community. As a side contribution, we an-
alyzed the dataset, identified previously unseen leaks
(including leaks over plain TCP and UDP, leaks while
the app is in the background, and malicious scanning
for rooted devices) and behavioral patterns (e.g. com-
munities of domains and mobile apps involved in ex-
posing private information).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews related work. Section 3 describes our
system’s rationale, design and implementation. Section 4
evaluates AntShield’s classification accuracy and run-time
performance; it also presents our collected dataset and find-
ings therein. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Different communities are working on improving data trans-
parency and exposing or preventing potential privacy leaks.
Permissions are useful but not sufficient: (i) users typically
accept to install apps by default; (ii) permissions do not pro-
tect against inter-app communication and poorly documented
system calls; and (iii) they do not capture run-time behavior.
Using a custom OS or a rooted phone one can get access to
fine-grained information on the device, including network
traffic. Phonelab [6] and others [7, 8] use packet capturing
APIs such as tcpdump or iptables-log. These are powerful
but inherently limited to small scale-deployment as the over-
whelming majority of users do not have rooted phones, and
wireless providers and phone manufacturers strongly dis-
courage rooting. The same limitation applies to approaches
that use a custom OS to dynamically intercept leaks (e.g.
TaintDroid [9]) or permission requests to certain resources
(e.g. AppFence [10]). Static analysis tools such as An-
droidLeaks [11] and PiOS [12] are limited by having to
constantly download and analyze all available apps, which
is not scalable. Moreover, static analysis suffers from inher-
ent imprecisions, is not representative of what can happen at
run-time, and cannot deal with native or dynamically loaded
code.
Within the network measurements community, a number
of prior works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] have looked for personal in-
formation leaks in network traffic. This includes monitoring
in the middle of the network (as in Meddle [1] and Recon
[2]) or on the device itself (as in AntMonitor ([3, 4]) and
Lumen (a.k.a. Haystack) [5]). AntMonitor and Lumen
detect leaks on the device, but require a blacklist of strings
(potential PII leaks) known a priori to search for; therefore,
they are unable to detect leakage of information that changes
dynamically or is not part of the list.
To remedy this limitation, Recon recently applied ma-
chine learning techniques to predict whether or not a given
packet contains PII [2]. They broke packets into words based
on delimiters (e.g. ‘?’, ‘=’, ‘:’) and then used these words as
features in classification. Various methods were used to en-
sure that the PII themselves and strings that occur too often
or too infrequently are not part of the feature list, see [2]
for details. To decide whether or not a packet contains PII (a
binary classification problem), Recon used the Java Weka li-
brary’s [13] C4.5 Decision Tree (DT), and then heuristics for
extracting the type of leak. To improve classification accu-
racy Recon built specialized classifiers for each destination
domain that received enough data to train such a classifier.
For the rest of the domains, a general classifier was built.
For the heuristic step, Recon maintained a list of probabil-
ities that a particular key-word corresponds to a PII value.
For each PII type, the probability was calculated by taking
the number of times the key was present in a packet with
the given PII, and dividing it by the number of times the
key appeared in all packets. During PII extraction, Recon
looked for keys with probability higher than an empirically
computed threshold. Their code and dataset are available at
[14].
Recon is the closest to our work, thus we use it as our
baseline for comparison throughout the paper. The key dif-
ference lies in the centralized vs distributed approach. Re-
con collected its datasets in the middle of the network, trai-
ned and applied the classifiers in a centralized way. Ant-
Shield operates on the device, which poses unique system
challenges and learning opportunities, and paves the way for
truly distributed learning of privacy leakage.
3. SYSTEM DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Goals and Design Rationale
Problem Statement. Mobile devices have access to a
wealth of resources and information, much of which is per-
sonal and potentially sensitive. We will refer to such person-
ally identifiable information as PII. Examples include:
• Device Identifiers: IMEI, AndroidID, phone number,
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serial number, ICCID, MAC Address.
• User identifiers: credentials (per app, usually transmit-
ted over HTTPS), advertiserID, email.
• User demographic: first/last name, gender, zipcode,
city, etc. - unavailable through Android APIs.
• Location: (latitude and longitude coordinates, avail-
able through Android APIs.
• User-defined: the user can also define any custom string
that should be monitored (e.g. see GUI in Fig. 2(a)),
such as digits of her credit card.
A key insight of our design is the distinction on whether
PII of interest is known to the device or not. We refer to
PII that consists of strings known a priori on the device (e.g.
via Android APIs, or defined by the user) as predefined. We
refer to PII that is not known to our AntShield system (e.g.
hidden from apps or changing dynamically) as unknown. By
default, we assume that any PII available via Android API
calls are predefined (e.g. IMEI, AndroidID, phone number,
serial number, ICCID, MAC Address, advertiserID, email,
and location), and the rest are unknown (e.g. username login,
password, first/last name, gender, zipcode, and city).
Our system employs different techniques to detect the trans-
mission of predefined PII (String Matching) and unknown
PII (classification). We refer to the transmission of a packet
from the device to the network, containing at least one PII,
as a privacy exposure (or leak). This transmission may be:
(i) intended to collect information about the user; (ii) benign,
e.g. necessary for the operation of the app, acceptable to the
user, or (iii) of the honest-but-curious nature. Distinguish-
ing between privacy exposure and an actual privacy leak is
out of the scope of this paper, and we refer to the two terms
interchangeably, meaning “exposure.” Our goal is to detect
privacy exposures on the device with low overhead, accu-
rately and in real-time. This is a first step towards enabling
distributed learning of PII exposures.
Design Objectives and Choices. First, we want a solu-
tion that can be used by the non-sophisticated end-user: a
mobile app that the user can simply install (as an app, with-
out rooting the phone), enable in the background, and occa-
sionally interact with. Second, we want a solution that oper-
ates purely on the device and does not redirect traffic through
a middle server. This has several advantages: it does not
need to expand the trust base (data does not need to leave
the user’s device), and it is well positioned to have access
to rich information available on the device (app names, and
predefined PII). To meet both of these goals, we use the Ant-
Monitor Library v0.1.5 [3]. To the best of our knowledge,
AntMonitor is the most efficient implementation (in terms
of throughput, battery and other resources) for on-device
packet interception and inspection of both unencrypted and
encrypted traffic, today; see [3] for details. AntMonitor
relies on a VPN service on the device (but not on a remote
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Figure 1: AntShield Architecture. It consists of a mobile app
on the device and a remote server. Real-time classification consists
of the following steps: each packet is intercepted by AntMonitor
Library, mapped to an app, and analyzed for multiple predefined
and unknown leaks; detection occurs before the packet is forwarded
towards its remote destination (and an action may be taken to block
the leak). Offline operations include loading and (re)training the
classifiers, and (if the user agrees) uploading logs to the server.
VPN server), which is the only way to intercept traffic to-
day without rooting the phone. If more efficient libraries
for packet interception become available in the future, Ant-
Shield’s modular design allows to replace this component.
Third, we want to accurately detect a comprehensive range
of PII in real-time, both predefined (through String Match-
ing), and the remaining unknown ones through machine learn-
ing models. Towards the first goal, we utilize the DPI API
provided by AntMonitor [3]. Towards the second goal, we
build specialized classifiers defined in Sec. 3.3.
3.2 PrivacyShield Architecture
The overview of the AntShield architecture is depicted in
Fig. 1. It consists of a mobile app and an (optional) server.
A brief overview of each component is described next.
Online Leak Detection. This is the core functionality
of our PII exposure detection. As shown in Fig. 1, Ant-
Shield leverages calls to AntMonitor Library (accept-
IPDatagram and acceptDecryptedSSLPacket) to
intercept packets (in clear text or decrypted SSL, respec-
tively). Each outgoing intercepted packet is analyzed with
DPI for predefined leaks and for features. The features are
then passed to classifiers to detect unknown leaks (described
in detail in Sec. 3.3). Either way, if a PII exposure is de-
tected, the user is notified and the exposure is logged. If the
user chooses to, the leaky packet can be blocked, or it can be
allowed to continue towards its remote destination.
Offline Analysis. This module can be used when heav-
ier processing is required. For example, to generate logs
3
(a) predefined PII, possible
actions, and custom filters
(name)
(b) Real-Time Visualization:
which apps transmit PII to
which remote servers
Figure 2: Select Screenshots of the AntShield Android
App.
on the device, which require I/O operations, we use Ant-
Monitor Library’s consumePacket() API from this
module. This module can be used to generate ground truth
on the device; and in the future, it can be extended to re-train
classifiers on the device without sending data to a central
server.
Storage (on-Device and/or Server). The AntShield app
comes pre-loaded with classifiers trained on our existing dataset
(Sec. 4.1), so that users have no need to contact any server
and can use the system as-is. Only if the user chooses to
do so, logs (packet traces, JSON or other meta data) can be
maintained on the device and/or occasionally be uploaded to
a server. The use of the server is optional – by default, logs
do not need be collected or leave the device. The user may
choose to share her data with the server to get the benefits
of crowdsourcing, and retrained classifiers. As an example
scenario, we used the logging capability of the Offline Anal-
ysis module to generate the dataset used in our evaluation.
Specifically, each captured packet was labeled with the type
of PII that it was leaking and the app name that generated the
packet. The PII itself was replaced, and the packet was con-
verted to a JSON format for easier processing at the machine
learning training stage (see Sec. 4.1 for details). In general,
this feature is useful for other researchers who may wish to
generate their own datasets manually or from user studies.
GUI. This component has two purposes. It allows the user
to specify various preferences, most importantly, the prede-
fined PII to be monitored. By default, these include PII avail-
able on the device through Android APIs, as shown in Fig.
2(a). Users that trust AntShield can also opt-in and pre-
define additional PII, such as name and gender or any string
(e.g. digits of a credit card). Second, AntShield’s GUI noti-
fies the user about PII exposed. From here, users can decide
to allow the leak to happen, replace the exposed PII with a
random string of the same length (so as not to alter the pay-
load size), or block the packet completely. Whatever action
the user selects, it is remembered for future occurrences of
the same PII/app combination. Users can view a history of
leaks at any time and can also see where each app sends data
as a graph of connections updated in real-time (Fig. 2(b)).
The edges of the graph can be filtered or annotated by the
leaked PII, and more information about the remote servers
receiving the leak can be displayed.
3.3 Leak Detection Methodology
At the heart of AntShield lies the online inspection of
network packets to detect if they contain PII.
First, we use a hybrid String Matching-classification
methodology. As described in Sec. 3.1, a key insight is that
PII can be split into two categories: predefined and unknown,
depending on whether they are known a priori or not. This
is an inherent advantage of operating on the device: Ant-
Shield has access to all the predefined strings and can use
DPI to search for them; we refer to this method as String
Matching. This not only gives us 100% accuracy on finding
predefined leaks, if they are not obfuscated, but also reduces
the set of PII that classifiers must learn, thereby improving
the accuracy of finding unknown leaks and reducing variance
(see Sec. 4.3).
Second, we treat PII detection as a Multi-Label problem,
since a packet may contain zero, one, or multiple PII. Our
classifiers decide, in one step, if any PII are contained in a
packet, and if so - what type. More specifically, we use Mu-
lan [15] to perform multi-label classification using the Bi-
nary Relevance (BR) transformation method [16]. The idea
is to train a separate binary classifier for each label. Since
the C4.5 DTs worked well for classifying leak vs non-leak,
we use them as the independent classifiers in BR.
Third, we build classifiers per-app, instead of per desti-
nation domain. This is possible thanks to AntShield run-
ning on the device: it can accurately map a packet to the
app that generated it. From a classification point of view,
per-app classifiers perform similarly to per-domain classi-
fiers, as shown in Sec. 4.3 and explained in Sec. 4.2. How-
ever, per-app classifiers have important system advantages.
First, they allow for easy setup and scalability: only the
few classifiers for the installed apps on the particular de-
vice must be loaded into memory. This is much smaller
than hundreds of domains contacted by those apps and the
third-party libraries contained within them. Second, they ap-
ply to all TCP and UDP traffic, not just to HTTP(S) traffic.
Third, per-app classifiers obviate the need for DNS lookups,
which are costly and inaccurate, but are necessary when us-
ing per-domain classifiers. Recon parsed HTTP(S) packets
to extract the host name (which is also costly in terms of
CPU) and decided which per-domain classifier to apply. One
possible solution is to do reverse-DNS lookup to map (all
TCP and UDP, not only HTTP(S)) packets to their intended
hosts. However, many companies opt-in to use third-party
web service providers (such as Amazon AWS), and for them,
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reverse-DNS returns host names that are not very useful (e.g.
ec2-54-164-159-29.compute-1.amazonaws.com). As awork-
around, it may be possible to implement a reverse-DNS
cache on the device by keeping track of all the DNS requests.
Unfortunately, we have seen many cases where the same IP
maps to multiple host names (again, due to third-party web
service usage). Finally, even if we could somehow achieve
perfect mapping of IPs to host names, there is still the prob-
lem of domain name extraction. One solution is to maintain
a public suffix list, but that would take up too much memory
on the mobile device. Another solution is to keep remov-
ing prefixes from the host name and do DNS queries until
a Start of Authority record is reached; but this would cause
too much network delay on each packet before it can even
be assigned a classifier.
3.4 Real-time Implementation on the Mobile
Device
The classifiers described in the previous section have value
on their own right. However, it is highly non-trivial to ap-
ply them in real-time on a mobile device, with limited CPU
and RAM. AntShield is the first system to achieve this goal
thanks to the following system optimizations.
Detecting PII in an Outgoing Packet. Our hybrid ap-
proach relies on String Matching to search for the prede-
fined leaks and on classification methodology to detect un-
known ones. The former benefits from the good performance
of AntMonitor Library’s efficient DPI module. The latter
needs to parse packets to extract words that are used as fea-
tures of the classifiers. With off-the-shelf Recon, to extract
words from a packet, several invocations of Java string pars-
ing methods would be required, which are extremely slow
on a mobile device. We were able to extract features from
the traffic while completely avoiding parsing by exploiting
the following observation: most decision trees are one-level
deep and only a third of the trees have a depth greater than
two. Therefore, we only need to extract the words that ap-
pear in the decision tree nodes and we can use DPI to search
for them. Since the Aho-Corasick algorithm used in the
AntMonitor Library can search for many strings in one
pass of the packet, having these extra words to search for
does not affect performance.
Extracting words that appear in the decision tree nodes
and using DPI to search for them works well in most cases.
However, in some cases the words are too small and can ac-
tually be part of a longer word. In this case, DPI search
would mark a feature as existent, when in fact it’s part of a
different word, causing an incorrect prediction. As an exam-
ple, hulu was receiving the word ‘profile’ in the packets that
also contained the user’s first name. However, many pack-
ets that did not contain any exposures, contained the word
‘video_profile.’ To avoid these DPI-based false positives,
we decided to keep the delimiters surrounding each word
during feature selection. So, in the case of hulu, we used
‘/profile?’ as the feature. This trick allowed us to extract
the same words with DPI as with Java parsing.
Minimizing Classifiers to Load in RAM. With limited
RAM, care must be taken when loading machine learning
models from disk to memory. To minimize the impact on
RAM, we: (i) load per-app models only for those apps that
are installed on the device; and (ii) perform a two-step train-
ing method to reduce the general classifier feature set (see
Fig. 1). Specifically, the general classifier has a feature set
size of over 12k, and during prediction needs the allocation
of a double array with size 12k+. While this is a small size
for a server, on the mobile device it causes major issues –
if one loads the full general classifier, most web pages and
applications do not load. This is because each time a packet
has to be predicted by the general classifier (when there is no
corresponding per-app classifier), the memory allocation be-
comes so large that a blocking garbage collection call has to
be executed by the Android OS after every prediction. This
blocks the main networking thread, causes connections to
time-out, and prevents pages from loading. We were able
to reduce the feature set by exploiting the existing classifier
tree: we re-trained the general classifier using only the words
that appear in the tree nodes as features. This resulted in a
feature set size of only 509, i.e. a 24x reduction for the gen-
eral classifier, which in itself allowed AntShield to run in
real time. Further improvements were achieved by reducing
the feature set of per-app classifiers. Overall, AntShield’s
memory usage was around 100 MB, which is acceptable:
many popular apps, e.g. Facebook, use as much as 200 MB
RAM.
Real-Time Packet-to-App Mapping. In order to call the
per-app classifiers, we first need to map a packet to the ap-
plication that generated it. The AntMonitor Library pro-
vides packet-to-app mapping but only off-line (e.g. after a
packet has been read off a queue on a different thread that
does not block the main networking thread) [3], which is not
fast enough to run on-line. Specifically, when using Ant-
Monitor Library’s original mapping implementation, we
were only able to reach a throughput of 1 Mbps when testing
with Speedtest. Upon further code and CPU usage analysis,
we found that the inefficiency stemmed from two issues: (i)
the AntMonitor Library was doing some Java string pars-
ing to extract the app UID, source IP/port, and destination
IP/port that were separated by a comma when returned from
the native C module; (ii) the AntMonitor Library was stor-
ing the mappings in a HashMap keyed by a String (made of
concatenating source/ destination IP/port numbers), which
caused many String comparisons whenever an item needed
to be fetched from the HashMap. To avoid these costly oper-
ations, we changed AntMonitor Library’s native C mod-
ule to return the app UID and the source port number only, as
separate elements in an array. (it is best to avoid using com-
plex data structures in native C). This way the Java part of the
code could separate out the UID (and fetch the correspond-
ing app name) and the source port of each open connection
without doing any parsing. The source port number is then
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ReCon
Public
dataset(s)
Ant-
Shield
dataset(s)
Auto Manual Auto Manual
# of Apps 564 91 414 149
# of packets 16761 13079 21887 25189
# of destination domains 450 368 597 379
# of leaks detected 1566 1755 4760 3819
# of unknown leaks 4 78 483 516
# of leaks in encrypted traffic - - 1513 1526
# of packets with multiple leaks 50 224 1506 790
# of background leaks - - 2289 639
# of HTTP packets 16761 13079 13694 13648
# of HTTPS packets - - 6830 8103
# of TCP packets - - 867 2264
# of leaks in TCP (other ports) - - 38 7
# of UDP packets - - 496 1174
# of leaks in UDP - - 17 12
Table 1: Summary of Datasets. Recon is the previous state-
of-the-art, collected in the middle of the network [2]. Ant-
Shield’s Manual and Automated datasets were collected on
the device.
used as the key to the HashMap that fetches the correspond-
ing app names. These improvements allowed us to do real-
time packet-to-app mapping while achieving network speeds
close to regular device operation speeds.
Real-time. The evaluation in Sec. 4.4 shows that our op-
timizations make the crucial difference for being able to de-
tect PII in real-time on the device: 1ms for extracting words
(as opposed to 30ms+ if parsing out all words) and 1ms for
classification.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 PrivacyShield Datasets
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our methodol-
ogy in detecting private information exposure, we collected
and analyzed two AntShield Datasets. We logged all pack-
ets generated by different apps on a test device (Nexus 6)
and converted each packet into a JSON object that reported
any PII exposures (see 3.1 for a list) and broke the packet
into any relevant fields (destination IP address/port, HTTP
method, if applicable, and etc). We collected two differ-
ent datasets, depending on how we interacted with apps, de-
scribed next.
Manual Testing. First, in order to assess PII leaks dur-
ing typical user behavior, we tested 100 most popular and
free Android apps, based on rankings in AppAnnie [17]. We
tested in batches: we installed 5 apps on the test device and
then used AntShield to intercept and log packets while in-
teracting with each app for 5min. After all apps in the batch
were tested, we switched off the screen and waited 5min to
catch any packets sent in the background. Next, we unin-
stalled each app and finally, turned off AntShield.
Automatic Testing. We also used the UI/Application Ex-
erciser Monkey [18] to automatically interact with apps. This
does not capture typical user behavior but enables extensive
and stress testing of more apps. We installed 4 batches of
100 applications each, and had Monkey perform 1,000 ran-
dom actions in each tested app while AntShield logged the
generated traffic. At the end of each batch, we switched off
the screen of the test device and waited for 10min to catch
additional exposures sent in the background.
Summary. Since the two (Automatic and Manual) Ant-
Shield Datasets capture different behaviors, we describe and
analyze them separately. However, for the purposes of train-
ing and testing classifiers, we merged them into one, referred
to as the AntShield Dataset. The AntShield datasets are
summarized in Table 1, next to the prior state-of-the-art PII
datasets collected by Recon [2].
Using AntShield to capture packets on the device has
several advantages compared to previous datasets collected
in the middle of the network: (1) we were able to accurately
map each packet to the app that generated it; (2) we kept
track of foreground vs. background apps, to see what kind
of data apps send while in the background; (3) we gained
insight into TLS, UDP, and regular TCP traffic, in addition
to HTTP; (4) scrubbing PII and labeling packets with the
type of PII they leak was fully automated: AntShield al-
ready provides predefined strings, and we entered the un-
known strings (e.g. fake test account credentials) as custom
filters (as in Fig. 2(a)). The resulting dataset contains more
and richer information about exposures than before. Some
advantages are inherent to running on the device (i.e. the
ability to capture contextual information, including the app
names). Other differences are due to changes in app versions
and leak behavior over time. Therefore, in addition to being
used to evaluate our methodology (Section 4.3), our datasets
have value on their own and we will make them available to
the community.
4.2 Exposures Found in the Datasets
Our datasets provide us with insights into the current state
of privacy leaks in the Android ecosystem. Some of the cap-
tured patterns were previously unknown, and are revealed
for the first time here. For example, we were able to de-
tect leaks happening in the background, leaks in plain TCP
and UDP (not belonging to HTTP(S) flows), two orders of
magnitude more unknown leaks than before (which is crucial
for training classifiers), several hundreds of packets with not
one but multiple leaks (which motivated our Multi-Label
approach), and malicious scanning for rooted devices.
Background Leaks. AntShield is in a unique position to
capture leaks that happen in the background vs. foreground,
and other contextual information that is only available on
the device. Table 1 shows that there is a substantial number
of background leaks (e.g. half of all leaks in the automatic
dataset) that should be brought to users’ attention and be in-
corporated into learning algorithms. We observed an order
of magnitude more background leaks in the top apps in the
automatic vs the manual datasets. One possible explanation
is that the random clicks in the automated test lead to click-
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App Name Leak Type # Leaks
com.roblox.client 2.280.107211 Username, Location 1234
com.ss.android.article.master3.2.7 City, Adid, Location, AndroidId,
IMEI
766
com.cleanmaster.security3.2.6 Adid, AndroidId 511
com.cyberpony.stickman.warriors.epic1.3 Adid, City, Location, Zipcode 434
com.paypal.android.p2pmobile6.9.0 City, FirstName, LastName, Seri-
alNumber, Zipcode, Adid, Androi-
dId, Password, Email
257
com.weather.Weather7.7.1 Adid, Location 172
com.pof.android3.45.2.1417399 Adid, Username, AndroidId 136
com.bitmango.go.wordcookies1.1.9 Adid, AndroidId 135
com.kiloo.subwaysurf1.68.0 Adid, IMEI, AndroidId 101
com.qisiemoji.inputmethod5.5.8.1570 Adid, IMEI, AndroidId 99
com.bitmango.go.blockhexapuzzle1.3.7 Adid, AndroidId 97
com.bitmango.rolltheballunrollme1.6.5 Adid, AndroidId 95
com.jb.zcamera2.48 Adid, AndroidId, IMEI, Email,
IMSI
87
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 3819
Domain Name Leak Type # Leaks
isnssdk.com Adid, IMEI. AndroidId 739
roblox.com Location 679
facebook.com Adid 651
rbxcdn.com Location 561
mopub.com Adid 340
bitmango.com Adid 262
paypal.com AndroidId 257
appsflyer.com Adid, AndroidId 239
goforandroid.com Adid, IMEI, IMSI, AndroidId 171
applovin.com Adid 157
pof.com Adid, AndroidId 121
adjust.com Adid 96
adkmob.com Adid, AndroidId 88
pandora.com Adid, AndroidId, Zipcode 78
wish.com Adid 78
lyft.com Location 68
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 3819
Table 2: Manual dataset: Summary of applications and domain names with most leaks and their leak types
App Name Leak Type # Leaks
cmbinc12.mb32b5.98 City, Adid, Location, AndroidId,
Zipcode
1326
com.kitkatandroid.keyboard3.9.9 Adid, , Location, AndroidId, Seri-
alNumber
1046
com.episodeinteractive.android.catalog5.61.1+g Adid, Gender, SerialNumber, An-
droidId
438
com.myyearbook.m11.8.0.681 Adid, City, Location, Zipcode 263
System0.1.5 Username, City, Zipcode, Adid,
AndroidId, Location, IMEI, IMSI
255
com.clearchannel.iheartradio.controller7.2.2 Adid, Zipcode 220
com.cmcm.live3.4.9 Adid, AndroidId, Location, IMEI,
SerialNumber, IMSI
213
com.apalon.myclockfree2.29 Adid, City 206
com.freecraft.pocket.edition2.0 Adid, City, Location, Zipcode 174
com.madebyappolis.spinrilla2.2.4 Adid, City, Location, AndroidId,
Zipcode
146
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 4760
Domain Name Leak Type # Leaks
mopub.com Adid 2878
pocketgems.com AndroidId 416
applovin.com Adid 409
appsflyer.com Adid 312
ksmobile.net SerialNumber, Location, AndroidId 216
ihrhls.com Adid 215
goforandroid.com AndroidId 210
tapjoyads.com IMEI, AndroidId 169
amplitude.com Adid 152
lkqd.net Adid, AndroidId 150
tapjoy.com Adid, AndroidId 148
pinterest.com AndroidId 112
bitmango.com Adid 109
3g.cn AndroidId 107
instagram.com Username 105
crashlytics.com Adid, AndroidId 98
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 4760
Table 3: Auto dataset: Summary of applications and domain names with most leaks and their leak types
App Name Leak Types Port
System IMEI, IMSI,
AndroidId
8080
com.jb.gosms AndroidId 10086
com.jiubang.go.music AndroidId 10086
air.com.hypah.io.slither Username 10086
com.jb.emoji.gokeyboard AndroidId 10086
com.gau.go.launcherex AndroidId 10086
com.steam.photoeditor AndroidId 10086
com.jb.zcamera AndroidId 10086
com.flashlight.brightestflashlightpro AndroidId 10086
Domain Name Leak Types Port
206.191.155.105 Username 454
206.191.154.41 Username 454
23.236.120.208 AndroidId 10086
3g.cn IMEI, IMSI, AndroidId 8080
23.236.120.220 AndroidId 10086
Table 4: TCP packets (non HTTP/S) sending PII over ports
other than 80, 443, 53
ing on ads, which generate traffic even after the app moves
to the background.
Auto vs. Manual. Tables 2 and 3 show the top apps/domains
that collect the most PII in our manual and auto datasets, re-
spectively. We find that the top apps and domains differ for
each dataset, indicating that it is important to test apps man-
ually so as to fairly represent what happens to real users. For
instance, we see that the auto dataset is more ad-oriented,
while the top domains for the manual dataset include non-
ad networks such as facebook, paypal, and pandora. This
is most likely due to the fact that our Monkey tests ended up
clicking on ads during the random events, whereas real users
tend to avoid ads.
Non-HTTP Leaks. Prior state-of-the-art datasets [2] re-
ported only HTTP(S) leaks. Table 1 reports, for the first
time, leaks in non-HTTP(S), including plain TCP or UDP
packets. Our dataset contains 29 UDP leaks, all of which
were exposing Advertiser Id and Location. As shown in Ta-
ble 4, we also found some apps (mostly games and photo-
editing apps) that leaked the device ID over non-standard
(80, 443, 53) TCP ports, such as 8080 or 10086 (a port
known to be used by trojans, Syphillis and other threats [19]).
The destination IPs could not be resolved by DNS, indicat-
ing that the application may have hard-coded those IPs. We
were also able to detect ver 3000 TCP packets with PII expo-
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Figure 3: Understanding the behavior of leaking through graph analysis of the AntShield dataset. The graph consists of
nodes corresponding to destination domains and edges representing the similarity of two domains. Two domains are similar if
there are common apps that send packets with PII exposures to both domains; the more common apps leak to these domains,
the more similar they are, the larger the width of an edge between them. The color of a domain node indicates the types of PII
it receives. One can observe from the graph structure that domains form communities that capture interesting patterns: (1) The
large communities on the left and bottom consist mostly of ad networks; ad exchanges are nodes in between ad communities;
(2) Facebook/Google domains are a different community on their own, on the top left; (3) small apps contact only their own
domain, leading to isolate domain nodes; (4) domains in the same community receive the same type of leaks (as indicated by
the color of nodes).
sure, most of which are TCP segments, belonging to a larger
HTTP packet. It is important to be able to classify these
packets as well, since we will be receiving them through the
VPN during real time inspection in AntShield.
HTTPS Leaks. Since traffic is increasingly over HTTPS
than HTTP, we need to inspect and train on HTTPS traf-
fic as well. However, due to their sensitive nature, previous
HTTPS datasets [2] were not made publicly available and
we had to collect our own. Table 5 summarizes the leaks we
discovered in HTTPS traffic. The top app com.ss.android.-
article.master is a news app, thus it makes sense for it
to query the user’s city, perhaps to fetch localized news.
However, it is unclear why the app needs the user’s IMEI
(when it already has the AdId) and the specific longitude
and latitude coordinates of the user. Another example is
com.cmcm.live - it leaks 5 different device identifiers for
no apparent reason. Hence, although well-behaving apps
should use HTTPS, they should also be inspected for po-
tential privacy leaks as not all information that they gather
is necessary for their functionality. We also found that the
majority of top domains receiving PII over HTTPS were ad-
related.
Checking for Rooted Devices. We noticed a suspicious
flag called “jailbroken” or “device.jailbroken” leaked by sev-
eral apps (e.g. com.bitstrips.imoji, com.yelp.android, com.ze-
ptolab.ctr.ads, etc). This flag was found in the URI content
or in the body of a POST method in the packets, and it was
set to 1 if the device was rooted, or to 0 otherwise. In Table 6,
we show the applications that contain this field in our dataset
and the domain to which the “jailbroken” flag is being sent.
We also show other types of leaks that the particular domain
collects. From the table, we see that the flag is usually ac-
companied with a device identifier. Several apps send this
flag to the same domain (upsight-api.com, an ad network),
which indicates that an ad library is probably leaking this
information, rather than the app itself.
Behavioral Analysis of PII Leaks. An interesting direc-
tion for analyzing the AntShield dataset is via behavioral
analysis. For instance, we can ask: (i) what can the com-
munication between mobile apps and destination domains
reveal about tracking and advertising? (ii) what type of in-
formation leaks to what domains and how to define similar-
ity of apps or domains with respect to leaks? Fig. 3 show-
cases one graph that visualizes similar destination domains
with respect to leaks they received, as captured in the Ant-
Shield dataset. We define two domains to be similar if they
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App Name Leak Type # Leaks
com.ss.android.article.master3.2.7 City, Adid, Location, AndroidId,
IMEI
752
com.cleanmaster.security3.2.6 Adid, AndroidId 174
com.paypal.android.p2pmobile6.9.0 City, FirstName, LastName, Zip-
code, Adid, SerialNumber, Androi-
dId, Password, Email
131
com.offerup2.3.12 Adid, Username, FirstName, Loca-
tion, Zipcode, AndroidId
114
com.cmcm.live3.4.9 Adid, AndroidId, Location, IMEI,
SerialNumber, IMSI
114
me.lyft.android4.20.3.1439781 City, FirstName, LastName, Seri-
alNumber, Zipcode, PhoneNumber,
Location, AndroidId
112
com.pinterest5.6.2 Adid, AndroidId 111
com.weather.Weather7.7.1 Adid, Location 110
com.qisiemoji.inputmethod5.5.8.15709 Adid, IMEI, AndroidId 83
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 3039
Domain Name Leak Type # Leaks
mopub.com Adid 2380
isnssdk AndroidId, IMEI 805
roblox.com Location 679
applovin.com Adid 566
rbxcdn.com Location 561
appsflyer.com Adid 549
facebook.com Adid 391
bitmango.com Adid 371
goforandroid.com AndroidId 262
ihrhls.com Adid 219
pocketgems.com AndroidId 211
ksmobile.net SerialNumber, Location, AndroidId 159
tapjoy.com Adid, AndroidId 151
tapjoyads.com IMEI, AndroidId 147
wish.com Adid 139
paypal.com AndroidId 131
pof.com pof.com 122
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 3039
Table 5: Summary of applications and domain names with HTTPS leaks in our dataset (manual and auto)
App Name Domain Leak Types
com.bitstrips.imoji
10.2.32, 10.3.76
pushwoosh.com AndroidId
com.nianticlabs-
.pokemongo 0.57.4
upsight-api.com Location, AndroidId
com.psafe.msuite 3.11.6 ,
3.11.8
upsight-api.com AndroidId
com.yelp.android 9.5.1 bugsnag.com AndroidId
com.zeptolab.ctr.ads
2.8.0
onesignal.com AndroidId
com.namcobandai-
games.pacmantournaments
6.3.0
namcowireless.com AndroidId
com.huuuge.casino.slots
2.3.185
upsight-api.com AndroidId
com.cmplay.dancingline
1.1.1
pushwoosh.com AndroidId
Table 6: Applications with "jailbroken" field
are contacted by the same set of applications (see the box on
the right inside Fig. 3). For example, domains A and B are
similar because they are contacted by two apps (app1, app2).
We depict the similarity of domains A and B as an edge on
the graph of domains, at the bottom of the box. This data can
be readily extracted from our trace, together with the type of
information that was transmitted from apps to domains.
The graph depicted on the left side of Fig. 3 shows a pro-
jection of the underlying bipartite graph (middle step in the
box) on domains (last step in the box); the graph is plotted
and analyzed using Gephi [20]. Nodes in this graph repre-
sent domains; the edges indicate similar nodes as per above
definition; the width of the edge indicates the number of
common applications; and the domain color corresponds to
the type of leaked PII. The clusters of domains in the graph
are the output of a community detection algorithm, which is
a heuristic that tries to optimize modularity.1
1The main idea is that for specific node i, it tries to assign dif-
ferent communities of its neighbors like node j’s community as i’s
community and compute the gain of modularity for whole network.
The community which maximize the modularity will be the proper
one. If the gain of modularity be negative or zero, i keeps its com-
munity. This process is an iterative process which is done for all
nodes. This algorithm is implemented in Gephi software [20], and
The graph in Figure 3 reveals interesting patterns about
PII leakage in the AntShield dataset. First, advertising is
the result of coordinated behavior. For example, it is easy
to identify ad exchanges: mopub.com is in the center of all
communication; and inner-active.mobi and nexage.com
are also clearly shown as hubs. All three large communities
on the bottom and left of the graph correspond to ad net-
works. Second, on the top left, there is a community of do-
mains that belong mostly to Google and Facebook, and two
domains (pof.com and plentyoffish.com) of a dating ser-
vice. The latter could be because the dating app also sends
statistics (e.g. for advertising purposes) to Google and Face-
book, in addition to its own servers, as suggested by the
type of PII being sent (gender and device ID, represented
by the yellow color). Third, not all domains belong to a
community: some are well-behaved and are contacted only
by their own app. For instance the white-colored domain zil-
low.com towards the bottom center of the graph is an isolate
node and only receives information about the user’s location,
which makes sense since it provides a real-estate service.
Another example is the blue-colored domain hbonow.com:
it is only contacted by its own app and only receives the ad-
vertising ID to serve ads. Another observation from Figure
3 is that most domains in the same community receive the
same type of PII (as indicated by the domain color). This
can be explained by the common ad libraries shared among
different apps that fetch the same PII.
In general, similarity of apps and domains based on their
network activity can be exploited to infer abusive behavior
(e.g. advertising, tracking, or malware) in mobile traffic, and
this is one promising direction for future work.
4.3 Classification Evaluation
Classification Schemes under Comparison. In this sec-
tion, we use our datasets to compare the classification accu-
racy of the proposed AntShield approach (see Section 3.3)
to the previous state-of-the-art Recon approach (Section 2).
works with weighted graphs also.
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Since our proposed method combines several ideas, we also
report results from the evaluation of individual ideas, to help
assess which idea brings the most benefit:
1. Complete Recon approach as per Section 2: classify
all (predefined and unknown) exposures, using binary
classifiers first to detect a leak, then heuristics to deter-
mine the type of leak.
2. Recon classifying unknown exposures only.
3. String Matching on predefined exposures, Recon trai-
ned on unknown; testing done on all exposures.
4. Multi-Label classification trained and tested on pre-
defined and unknown exposures.
5. Multi-Label classification trained and tested only on
unknown.
6. CompleteAntShield as per Section 3.3: String Match-
ing for predefined and Multi-Label classification for
unknown leaks; Multi-Label trained on unknown only,
testing done on all exposures.
Per-app vs. Per-domain classifiers. In Section 3.3, we
discussed the system advantages of using per-app instead of
per-domain classifiers. In this section, we show that their
classification performance is similar (which is also justified
by the insights at the end of Section 4.2). For each method,
we compare how well the per-domain, per-app, and general
classifiers perform. We train specialized classifiers for those
domains and apps that contain at least one positive sample
(packet with an exposure), and one negative sample (packet
with no exposure). In that sense, we find that per-app clas-
sifiers are able to cover more data than the per-domain clas-
sifiers. In particular, we obtain the following numbers for
packets covered by a classifier:
• All PII, per-app classifiers: 211 (93.3% of traffic, 99.5%
of packets with PII)
• All PII, per-domain classifiers: 182 (63.6% of traffic,
95.0% of packets with PII)
• unknown PII, per-app classifiers: 47 (54.4% of traffic,
99.5% of packets with unknown PII)
• unknown PII, per-domain classifiers: 49 (24.5% of traf-
fic, 87.4% of packets with unknown PII)
This is expected since apps generally exhibit more diverse
behavior by connecting to various domains, some of which
collect PII and some of which do not. Thus, we are more
likely to find apps that have sent at least one packet contain-
ing PII and one packet without PII, as opposed to domains
that receive packets with and without PII.
Evaluation Approaches and Metrics. After classifying
a packet, either a leak is detected with a particular PII type,
or No Leak is detected. Depending on how one summa-
rizes these numbers over all packets classified, we may have
Figure 4: Evaluation approaches: (1) Binary Classification: we
assess how well we identify whether or not a packet contains a PII
(Sec. 4.3.1); (2) Leak Classification: we assess how well we infer
the PII type from packets that already contain a PII, ignoring pack-
ets without PII (Sec. 4.3.2); (3) Combined Classification - assess
how well we identify the PII type and the No Leak label, consider-
ing all packets (Sec. 4.3.3).
different assessments. In particular, whether or not we con-
sider packets that do not contain PII, affects the numbers,
since this is the majority of the packets. We considered three
evaluation schemes, summarized in Fig. 4:
1. Binary Classification: this approach evaluates how well
the applicable algorithms classify a packet as contain-
ing an exposure or not (Sec. 4.3.1).
2. Leak Classification: this approach evaluates how well
each algorithm distinguishes PII types in packets that
contain an exposure (Sec. 4.3.2), i.e. packets without
a PII are not taken into account.
3. Combined Classification: this approach evaluates how
well each algorithms distinguishes among PII types and
“no leak” (Sec. 4.3.3), i.e. packets without a PII are
taken into account.
For each approach, we perform 5-fold cross-validation on
the given model (unless otherwise specified), and calculate
the average and the standard deviation across the trained
specialized classifiers. (Since Recon’s second (non-binary)
step and String Matching are both heuristic, we did not
perform cross-validation on these methods when evaluating
leak and combined classification, but simply ran the algo-
rithms on the entire applicable dataset (columns 1-3 and 6)
in the Tables.)
Because a packet can leak more than one PII type, for the
latter two approaches, we use evaluation metrics specific to
multi-labeling problems [21]. We report : (i) accuracy: the
number of correct labels, divided by the number of predicted
and true labels, (ii) precision: the number of correct labels,
divided by the number of predicted labels, (iii) recall: the
number of correct labels, divided by the number of true la-
bels.
4.3.1 Binary Classification
We report the binary classification results in Table 7 for
the two machine learning algorithms under consideration:
Recon’s DT, and our Multi-Label BR. We report the stan-
dard metrics for binary classification: F-measure, specificity,
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Method
Recon on All PII Recon on un-
known
Multi-Label
on All PII
Multi-Label
on unknown
Per-Domain Aver-
age
F-measure 98.0% ± 6.80 97.2% ± 14.2 97.1% ± 9.32 97.2% ± 11.3
specificity 97.5% ± 8.10 98.5% ± 4.35 98.4% ± 5.75 98.9% ± 5.72
recall 98.5% ± 6.78 97.9% ± 14.1 97.1% ± 9.38 97.3% ± 9.46
Per-App Average
F-measure 97.0% ± 7.99 96.4% ± 14.9 96.2% ± 7.25 96.4% ± 12.0
specificity 98.1% ± 4.24 96.8% ± 11.3 96.4% ± 7.30 98.3% ± 8.87
recall 96.4% ± 8.95 97.6% ± 14.5 97.4% ± 6.48 95.9% ± 12.1
General
F-measure 97.5% 94.9% 95.5% 99.5%
specificity 98.9% 99.8% 95.6% 91.8%
recall 95.8% 91.9% 98.4% 99.8%
Table 7: Binary Classification Results (Sec. 4.3.1)
Method
(1) Recon on
All PII
(2) Recon on
unknown
(3) String
Matching
& Recon on
unknown
(4) Multi-
Label on All
PII
(5) Multi-
Label on
unknown
(6) String
Matching &
Multi-Label
Per-
Domain
Avg
accuracy 72.7% ± 39.7 69.5% ± 45.5 95.9% ± 18.4 99.2% ± 1.90 99.3% ± 2.88 98.5% ± 11.0
precision 74.8% ± 39.3 69.5% ± 45.5 96.2% ± 18.1 99.3% ± 1.95 99.3% ± 3.21 98.5% ± 11.0
recall 73.5% ± 39.6 69.5% ± 45.5 95.9% ± 18.4 99.3% ± 1.79 99.5% ± 2.11 98.9% ± 10.4
Per-App
Avg
accuracy 73.2% ± 31.1 69.0% ± 42.7 97.6% ± 13.1 98.8% ± 2.24 98.9% ± 3.23 99.4% ± 4.58
precision 76.7% ± 30.4 69.0% ± 42.7 98.0% ± 12.8 98.9% ± 2.20 99.0% ± 3.29 99.4% ± 4.58
recall 73.5% ± 31.0 69.1% ± 42.8 97.6% ± 13.1 98.9% ± 2.18 99.1% ± 2.40 100% ± 0.06
General
accuracy 49.9% 50.2% 97.1% 77.4% 81.8% 99.3%
precision 58.2% 50.3% 97.6% 79.6% 84.7% 99.5%
recall 53.3% 50.3% 97.1% 75.9% 79.4% 99.7%
Table 8: Leak Classification Results (Sec. 4.3.2).
Method
(1) Recon on
All PII
(2) Recon on
unknown
(3) String
Matching
& Recon on
unknown
(4) Multi-
Label on All
PII
(5) Multi-
Label on
unknown
(6) Complete
AntShield
Per-
Domain
Avg
accuracy 89.1% ± 22.1 91.8% ± 17.7 98.5% ± 7.81 99.2% ± 2.02 99.3% ± 2.54 99.5% ± 3.99
precision 90.0% ± 21.5 91.8% ± 17.7 98.7% ± 7.55 99.2% ± 2.10 99.3% ± 2.82 99.5% ± 3.99
recall 89.2% ± 22.0 91.8% ± 17.7 98.5% ± 7.80 99.2% ± 1.83 99.5% ± 1.87 99.8% ± 1.60
Per-App
Avg
accuracy 91.3% ± 15.2 95.0% ± 12.6 99.5% ± 3.09 98.7% ± 2.31 98.9% ± 2.83 99.1% ± 7.35
precision 92.7% ± 14.1 95.0% ± 12.6 99.5% ± 2.96 98.7% ± 2.24 99.0% ± 2.89 99.1% ± 7.35
recall 91.4% ± 15.2 95.0% ± 12.6 99.5% ± 3.06 98.7% ± 2.26 99.1% ± 2.11 99.4% ± 6.91
General
accuracy 89.8% 99.1% 99.3% 78.5% 76.5% 99.8%
precision 91.3% 99.1% 99.4% 80.6% 79.1% 99.8%
recall 90.4% 99.1% 99.4% 77.0% 74.4% 99.9%
Table 9: Combined Classification Results (Sec. 4.3.3).
and recall. The first column is consistent with Recon’s own
reports in [2] - the model achieves high accuracy and low
false positives/negatives. The second column shows that
there is little benefit in focusing on unknown exposures only.
This makes sense, since in this binary step, we only want to
see whether or not a packet contains a leak, and not to ex-
tract what type of leak it is (see Fig. 4). The third and fourth
columns also show little benefit from our Multi-Label ap-
proach since within the BR, we still use a similar decision
tree to classify exposure vs non-exposure. We also note that
the standard deviation is higher when focusing on unknown
exposures only (columns 2 and 4). This is expected since
there is now less data to work with and some domains send
unknown PII only once in a while. Furthermore, in the case
of binary classification, the general classifiers perform close
to the specialized ones. However, we are interested in im-
proving the accuracy on the type of PII classification, and as
we show in the next two subsections, our approaches and the
specialized classifiers bring benefit there.
4.3.2 Leak Classification
The main results are summarized in Table 8. First, stan-
dard deviation is high because certain domains are easy to
learn and get near 100%, while a small set of domains are
difficult (some even have 0% accuracy). Recon’s heuris-
tic scores low when attempting to extract the PII type (col-
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umn 1); see Sec. 2 and [2] for a description of the heuris-
tic. Second, when we reduce the set of PII types to look for
(column 2), the heuristic performs slightly worse, probably
due to not having enough samples of unknown exposures.
Third, as expected, String Matching can find predefined
exposures with 100% accuracy, thus the overall accuracy im-
proves by ~20% (column 3 vs column 1), and standard de-
viation decreases. Fourth, the Multi-Label approach shows
significant improvement when compared to Recon’s heuris-
tic (column 4 vs column 1, and column 5 vs column 2); this
is expected, since we do not need to estimate probabilities
or calculate out thresholds. Fifth, the complete AntShield
achieves near perfect performance, and decreases the stan-
dard deviation (column 6 vs columns 1-3). Finally, in all
cases: (i) the specialized classifiers outperform the general
ones, and (ii) the per-app classifiers achieve higher accuracy
and lower standard deviation in our final method (column 6).
4.3.3 Combined Classification
The results for combined classification are shown in Table
9 and the difference between the performance of different
classification methods is less pronounced than before. This
is because the majority of packets do not contain a leak, the
binary classifiers work well (see Sec. 4.3.1) and classify the
"no exposure" packets correctly, making the results look de-
ceivingly good. This is why we also report the Leak Clas-
sification performance (Sec. 4.3.2), as it provides deeper
insight into the classifiers’ performance. We note that in this
case, the Multi-Label general classifiers appear to do worse
than the corresponding ones in Recon, because the results
reported in columns 4 and 5 are based on cross-validation,
so the general classifiers do not see all the training data and
do worse on some folds.
4.4 Real-Time Performance on the Device
In order to run privacy leakage detection in real-time on
the device, performance is key. Thus, we evaluate the two
feature extraction approaches: (1) Recon’s Java string pars-
ing, and (2) AntMonitor Library’s Aho-Corasick search
for features and predefined PII. We also compare: (1) Re-
con’s binary classification, and (2)AntShield’sMulti-Label
classification. We find that our classifiers have negligible
impact on battery and can run in real-time. This is mainly
thanks to the use of (i) Aho-Corasik for searching for multi-
ple strings, and (ii) the lean extraction of words to feed into
the classifiers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that PII classification is achieved in real-time on a mo-
bile device.
Setup. The tests were ran on a Nexus 6P with Android
7.1.1 and an 8-core QUALCOMM Snapdragon 810 proces-
sor with a clock speed of 2 GHz and battery capacity of
3450 mAh. We fed 10 HTTP packets of varying sizes (be-
tween 300-2000B) to each function under evaluation and
timed how long it took using System.nanoTime(). We re-
peated each test case 100 times and calculated the average
run-time and standard deviation. Each function was tested
in isolation, running on the main thread, so as to minimize
timing the overhead of possible thread switching.
Results. The results for the feature extraction approaches
are as follows: (1) Recon’s Java string parsing: 36 ms ± 17
ms; (2) Aho-Corasick search: 0.107 ms± 0.149 ms. Clearly,
AntMonitor Library’s efficient Aho-Corasick implemen-
tation brings orders of magnitude of benefit.
The results for classification techniques are: (1) Recon’s
binary classification: 0.041 ms± 0.029 ms; (2)Multi-Label
classification: 0.751 ms± 1.35 ms. As expected, the Multi-
Label classification takes a little longer, but it is still reason-
able and will not significantly impact user experience.
Training Time. Training Multi-Label classifiers gener-
ally takes twice as long as Recon’s binary classifiers. How-
ever, in both cases, a specialized classifier is trained within
tens of milliseconds even when done on a standard Windows
10 laptop. General classifiers can take up to tens of minutes.
When considering only unknown leaks, the number of labels
is reduced, and both the binary and the Multi-Label general
classifiers take under 10 min to train. However, since train-
ing is performed infrequently, and can be done at a remote
server (the classifiers can be fetched later by user devices),
we consider the training times a non-issue.
5. CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We presented AntShield - a system that performs, for the
first time, on-device detection of predefined PII and classifi-
cation of unknown PII, accurately (with higher accuracy and
lower variance than state-of-the-art) and with low overhead
(in real-time on the device). In the process, we collected and
analyzed a new dataset, which reveals interesting PII leaks
and patterns, some of which were previously unknown. Pre-
liminary graph analysis revealed interesting patterns of apps
and domains colluding to leak private information; behav-
ioral analysis of PII leaks is one promising direction for fu-
ture work. We will make the AntShield work available to
the research community, including the AntShield plugin for
the AntMonitor Library on the device, the training mod-
ule, and the AntShield dataset.
This work focused on a single device and it is the first nec-
essary step towards enabling distributed learning of PII leak-
age, where multiple devices running AntShield collaborate
with each other and/or a central entity to share training data
and/or classifiers. This is an important direction for future
work. If the users do not completely trust the central entity,
distributed machine learning frameworks for enabling col-
laborative learning, while preserving user privacy, are cur-
rently an active research area. We will consider Federated
Learning [22, 23] (which enables mobile phones to collab-
oratively learn a shared prediction model while keeping all
the training data on device, and is supported by Google);
the Teacher-Student model [24] (ensemble-based machine
learning on private datasets); and hybrid approaches such
as Blender [25] (a hybrid differential privacy model where
12
users have different privacy requirements).
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